Equal Protection and the Middle-Tier: The Impact on Women and Illegitimates by Vincent, John K.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 2 Article 6
12-1-1978
Equal Protection and the Middle-Tier: The Impact
on Women and Illegitimates
John K. Vincent
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
John K. Vincent, Equal Protection and the Middle-Tier: The Impact on Women and Illegitimates, 54 Notre Dame L. Rev. 303 (1978).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol54/iss2/6
Equal Protection and the "Middle-Tier":
The Impact on Women and Illegitimates
I. Introduction
The fourteenth amendment's prohibitions are clearly some "of the majestic
generalities of the Constitution."' Hence, that amendment has become the
most litigated and most controversial of the Civil War Amendments. Despite
more than a century of litigation, however, the United States Supreme Court
has been unable to develop a consistent and coherent body of principles to be
applied to equal protection cases.2 Instead, the Court has developed a "fluid"
form of equal protection analysis in which the Court focuses upon the dis-
criminatory character of the legislative classification and the state interests
asserted in support of that classification. If the Court determines that the state
objective does not justify the legislation's discriminatory character, or that the dis-
criminatory statute is only tenuously related to that objective, then the statute is
invalidated.
This note examines, in the contexts of sex-based discrimination and dis-
crimination against illegitimate children, the Supreme Court's "fluid" equal pro-
tection analysis. These two areas provide a fertile source of discussion since the
Court has found that neither of these areas fits easily into either of the traditional
categories of analysis-rational basis3 or strict scrutiny.4 This note also discusses
the reasons for the Court's approach as well as the problems inherent in it. The
note concludes with a suggested alternative mode of analysis. It is appropriate
at this point to review briefly the history of both equal protection and its
predecessor, substantive due process, since the Court's approach under both
headings is strikingly similar.
II. Substantive Due Process
From the Allgeyer v. Louisiana5 decision in 1905 to the mid-1930's, the
1 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2 When federal action is scrutinized, the appropriate provision is the due process clause of
the fifth amendment, which has been held to include protections substantially the same as
those afforded by the equal protection clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
(invalidating racial segregation in public schools of District of Columbia as violative of due
process guaranteed by fifth amendment).
3 See text accompanying notes 15 to 17 infra.
4 See text accompanying notes 18 to 21 infra.
5 165 U.S. 578 (1897). Allgeyer was the first Supreme Court decision overturning a
statute on substantive due process grounds. The case involved a Louisiana statute pro-
hibiting a person from doing an act in the state to effect insurance on any Louisiana property
from a marine insurance company which had not complied in all respects with Louisiana law.
The Court reversed defendant's conviction for mailing a letter advising an insurance company
in New York of the shipment of goods in accordance with a marine policy because the statute
in question violated the fourteenth amendment by depriving defendant of his liberty without
"due process of law." Speaking for the majority, Justice Peckham said, "The liberty mentioned
in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person . ..but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen .. .
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential ... ." Id. at 589.
Some critics have maintained that "liberty" at common law meant no more than freedom
from physical restraint and that the basic flaw of the substantive due process philosophy was
the expansion of this notion. See, e.g., Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 HARv. L. Rav. 431 (1926).
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Supreme Court invalidated on substantive due process grounds a considerable
number of laws dealing with social and economic matters. This period was
characterized by the Court's (1) expansive notion of liberty which included more
than a freedom from physical restraint,' (2) unduly narrow conception of govern-
mental objectives legitimately within state police power, 7 and (3) strict judicial
scrutiny of challenged legislation.
The interventionist stance taken by the Court8 during this time was severely
criticized by commentators and jurists alike. The critics felt that (1) the Court's
expansive view of "liberty" and "property" included values not specifically in
the Constitution, (2) the Court failed to state general standards to be applied in
evaluating legislation while the standards articulated were inadequate and
employed inconsistently, and (3) the Court became excessively preoccupied
with the permissibility of legislative ends.9
Beginning in 1934, the Court began to retreat from its activist position char-
acteristic of the substantive due process era. In that year, in Nebbia v. New
York,1" the Court upheld a New York statute authorizing an administrative
board to set prices for milk, stating that "the guaranty of due process . . .
demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained."'"
The Court proceeded to overrule Adkins three years later in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish1 by upholding the validity of a Washington statute providing
for the establishment of minimum wages for women. The demise of substantive
due process was completed by the Court's decision in Lincoln Union v. North-
western Co.1" There the Court specifically denounced its substantive due process
philosophy, stating that "the due process clause is no longer to be so broadly
construed that the Congress and the state legislatures are put in a straitjacket
6 Warren, supra note 5, at 462-63.
7 GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 567 (9th ed. 1975).
8 Four cases symbolizing the intervention of this era are Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
In Lochner, a statute which prohibited employers from requiring employees of bakeries
to work more than 60 hours a week or ten hours a day was held unconstitutional on the
ground that it interfered with the liberty of contract between employer and employees. The
opinion is characterized by the Court's use of a subjective standard of due process.
Three years later, the Court in Adair invalidated a federal law which prohibited employ-
ment contracts that required interstate railroad employees to refrain from becoming labor union
members (so-called "yellow dog" contracts). The Court saw the statute as an unjustifiable
interference with the liberty of contract. It relied upon Adair in Coppage to declare a similar
state statute unconstitutional.
Finally, in Adkins, the Court struck down the Minimum Wage Act of 1918 which author-
ized the fixing of minimum wage standards for adult women in any occupation in the District
of Columbia because it was an unconstitutional interference with the liberty of contract.
9 See GUNTHER, supra note 7, at 565.
10 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
11 Id. at 525.
12 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
13 335 U.S. 525 (1949). The Court sustained a Nebraska constitutional amendment and
a North Carolina statute which provided, in effect, that no persons in those states could be
denied an opportunity to obtain or retain employment regardless of their union status, nor
could an employer contract with a union organization so as to exclude persons from employ-
ment depending on their union affiliation.
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when they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which they
regard as offensive to the public welfare."" It was only as the era of substantive
due process came to a close that the equal protection clause began to attain a
genuine measure of vitality.
III. Equal Protection-The Two Tiers
During the period of time that the Court utilized substantive due process
analysis to strike down what it considered to be undesirable state statutes, the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection was rarely invoked. In fact, in
1927, Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell wrote that equal protection was "the usual
last resort of constitutional arguments... ."" When economic or social legislation
was challenged on equal protection grounds, the Court applied what has gen-
erally been known as the "rational basis" or "reasonable basis" standard. This
traditional and still viable model of review is best explained by the late Chief
Justice Earl Warren in McDonald v. Board of Election:
The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the
pursuit of that goal. Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally
... and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can
be conceived to justify them.'"
The test is highly permissive and requires such minimal scrutiny of challenged
statutes that it has been critically said to result in the "total abdication of
judicial review."'
Within a few years of Justice Holmes' remarks in Buck, Justice Stone, in
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 8 introduced a second standard of equal
protection review for those situations in which the discriminatory classification
either threatened a fundamental constitutional right 9 or involved a suspect class.2"
14 Id. at 536-37.
15 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
16 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
17 Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection: Two Tiers or An Analytical Grab-bag, 7
Loy. CHi. L. J. 754, 756 (1976).
18 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
19 The following have been labelled fundamental rights:
a. Voting-Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
b. Procreation-Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
c. Rights with Respect to Criminal Procedure-Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
d. Right to Travel-Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
20 By suspect class the Court means one including those people with characteristics that
are highly visible, immutable, and determined solely by birth which frequently bear no rela-
tion to ability to perform or contribute to society. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
686 (1973). In addition, it is usually a class that has been historically vilified and one that
has lacked political power. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973). The following have been labelled suspect classifications: a. Race-Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954); b. Ancestry-Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); c. AIienage-In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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Under such circumstances, Justice Stone suggested that the Court strictly
scrutinize the legislation by rigorously analyzing the necessity of the classification
as a means of accomplishing a compelling state interest. A statute subject to such
severe examination is nearly always struck down since the standard demands
"nothing less than perfection."21
At the beginning of the 1960's, judicial intervention under the banner of
equal protection was virtually nonexistent in other than racial discrimination
cases. During that decade, however, the Warren Court took an interventionist
stance embracing a rigid two-tier standard of strict scrutiny and rational basis.22
It used the equal protection clause to strike down state statutes interfering with
the newly established fundamental interests of voting, interstate travel, and
criminal appeal.2" Although the number of interests identified as fundamental
was in fact quite modest, the language of the Court's opinions was particularly
open-ended. Thus, the language seemed to invite consideration of analogous
spheres that would similarly qualify for rigorous scrutiny.
The Burger Court, however, has been reluctant to add to the list of funda-
mental interests specified by its predecessor.24 In addition, the Court has become
dissatisfied with the two-tier model itself. As a result, the Court, which nominally
still adheres to the two-tier system of equal protection review,22 has alluded to
at least one intermediate standard to handle those cases that fall between the
extremes of rational basis and strict scrutiny. Two such types of cases are those
involving discrimination based on sex and discrimination against illegitimate
children. Because the Court has found that neither category of discrimination
involves economic legislation, the "rational basis" test is not applicable; con-
versely, the classifications are not suspect and thus do not fall within strict
scrutiny analysis.
Examining these two areas is instructive because they illustrate the difficulty
that the Court has had in fashioning a standard of equal protection that can be
applied consistently to the wide variety of legislative classifications with which
it must contend. In addition, such an examination highlights the shortcomings
of the Court's "fluid" equal protection analysis.
A. Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children
1. The Warren Court
21 See the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
363-64 (1972) in which he addressed the question of how to judge the durational residency
requirements imposed by Tennessee as a precondition to the exercise of the ballot franchise
by new residents: "Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the 'compelling state
interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied
this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing
less than perfection."
22 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
23 See note 19 supra.
24 Gunther, supra note 22, at 12.
25 The Court specifically approved the two-tiered standard of review in San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
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In the 1968 case of Levy v. Louisiana," the Court first applied the guar-
antees of the equal protection clause on behalf of illegitimatesY There the Court
invalidated a Louisiana statute that prohibited an illegitimate child from re-
covering damages in a wrongful death action for the death of his mother.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, rejected the state's argument that the
legislation discouraged "bringing children into the world out of wedlock."2
He concluded that it was "invidious to discriminate" 9 against the illegitimate
children since "no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs [was] possibly relevant
to the harm that was done the mother."3 0 .
On the same day, the Court, in Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability
Insurance Co.,"' struck down as violative of the equal protection clause a
Louisiana wrongful death statute that permitted recovery by a parent of a
legitimate child but not by a parent of an illegitimate. Surprisingly, the Court
used deferential rational basis phraseology to invalidate the legislation. The
majority reached its decision because it could discern no rational basis for
assuming that illegitimacy would be promoted if the natural mother was allowed
to recover for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child."2 The statute was
therefore constitutionally flawed.
Although in the Levy and Glona opinions the Court purported to employ
the less demanding rational basis test, it is impossible to escape the conclusion
that the Court actually applied an equal protection analysis which was stronger
than that deferential standard. Justice Douglas' use of the term "invidious
discrimination" to characterize the classifications at issue compels this con-
clusion. Thus, the above-cited opinions seemed to indicate that classifications
based on illegitimacy would in the future be deemed constitutionally suspect."
2. The Burger Court
Levy and Glona were decided during the last days of the Warren Court.
Labine v. Vincent, 4 on the other hand, was decided by the Burger Court and
typified its reluctance to expand the number of suspect classifications and
fundamental interests. Labine involved legislation under which an illegitimate
26 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
27 At common law, an illegitimate child was said to be filius nullius, that is, the child of
nobody. He had no father according to the law, and his rights, especially the right of in-
heritance, were severely restricted. Until 1968, the Supreme Court did little more than
affirm the power of state legislatures to modify this common law rule. See e.g., Cope v. Cope,
137 U.S. 682 (1891), which upheld a Utah statute that provided for an illegitimate child and
its mother to inherit in like manner from the father.
28 391 U.S. at 70.
29 Id. at 72. The term "invidious discrimination" was Justice Douglas' personalized short-
hand for strict scrutiny. See Wallach & Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried
Mothers and Their Children: An Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection,
and the Uniform Parentage Act, 23 KAN. L. REv. 23, 40 (1974).
30 391 U.S. at 72.
31 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
32 Id. at 75.
33 Wallach & Tenoso, supra note 29, at 43; Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 479 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Illegitimacy].
34 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
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child was barred from receiving the same share of his father's estate as did his
legitimate sibling. Justice Black wrote the majority" opinion upholding the
intestate succession statute on the ground that the state had power to establish
rules for the protection and strengthening of family life through regulation of the
disposition of property. Levy and Glona were distinguished as tort cases while
Labine involved property rights." Furthermore, the Court differentiated Labine
from Levy because of the existence in the former of statutory alternatives for
legitimizing the child.
In his opinion, Justice Black simply refused to apply any type of equal
protection analysis in deference to the state's interest in regulating the disposition
of property at death. He indicated, however, that were he to have applied an
equal protection analysis, the rational basis test would have been the appropriate
standard;"S the statute would have been valid in view of the legitimate state
interest involved.3
9
a. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.-Reconciliation
The Levy, Glona, and Labine decisions are difficult to reconcile. One year
after Labine, however, the Court attempted to clarify its position on the rights of
illegitimates. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,4 the Court invalidated
a Louisiana statute which denied equal workmen's compensation recovery rights
to a dependent but unacknowledged illegitimate child. The Court found Levy to
be the applicable precedent because of similarities in the origins and purposes of
the statutes in each case and because of Louisiana's pattern of discrimination in
recovery rights. Speaking for the Court, Justice Powell stated that the essential
inquiry in Weber was a dual one: "What legitimate state interest does the
classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?"'" The Court then concluded that the state interest in legitimate
family relationships was important, but was not served by the statute. The Court
found no significant relationship between the classifications and "those recognized
purposes of recovery which workmen's compensation statutes commendably
serve."'" Thus, in the Court's view, the discriminatory character of the classifica-
tion was not justified.
The decision in Weber marked one of the most overt attempts by the Court
to escape the two-tier framework of equal protection analysis. Justice Powell's
35 Justice Black, along with Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissented in Levy and Glona.
In the interim between the Glona and Labine decisions, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun joined the Court. The five of them constituted the majority.
36 401 U.S. at 535-36.
37 Id. at 539. Vincent could have left one-third of his property to his illegitimate daughter
if he had executed a will. Also, he could have married his daughter's mother in which case
the child could have inherited his property either by intestate succession or by will. Finally,
he could have voluntarily acknowledged his paternity.
38 Id. at 536 n.6.
39 Labine has been criticized by commentators for being deeply rooted in moral prejudice.
See Wallach & Tenoso, supra note 29, at 47-48. The Court has since limited Labine's ap-
plication. See Trimble, 430 U.S. 762 and text accompanying notes 62 to 73 infra.
40 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
41 Id. at 173.
42 Id. at 175.
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majority opinion blurred the distinctions between strict and minimal scutiny
through the use of a comprehensive two-fold inquiry. This inquiry attempts to
center on the merits of the particular controversy and allow for an examination of
the conflicting policies and interests surrounding a challenged statute. Inherent
in this examination is a comparison by the Court of the legislative ends sought
to be achieved with the means chosen to fulfill those objectives. If the Court
concludes that the governmental interest is not adequately promoted by the
legislative classification, the statute is invalidated. The use of this two-fold
inquiry can be traced throughout the succeeding cases on illegitimacy.
b. After Weber
In Gomez v. Perez4 3 and New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,4" two
per curiam opinions rendered in 1973, the Court employed the Weber two-
pronged inquiry by examining the relative importance of the state interest and
the character of the discrimination caused by the classification. In Gomez, the
Court struck down a Texas law which denied the right of paternal support to an
illegitimate child while granting it to a legitimate offspring. The Court held
that "once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to
needed support from their natural father there is no constitutionally sufficient
justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its
natural father has not married its mother.
4 5
The Gomez principle was applied in Cahill in which the state government,
rather than the natural father, had the judicially enforceable duty to provide
needed financial support. The Court struck down as violative of equal pro-
tection a statute limiting benefits of the "Assistance to Families of the Working
Poor" program to those households in which the parents were "ceremonially"
married to each other and had at least one minor child. In both Gomez and
Cahill, the Court appeared to compare means with ends using a standard less
demanding than strict scrutiny, but one sufficiently strong to show that distinc-
tions based on illegitimacy were important and deserving of a high degree of
protection.4 6
In Jiminez v. Weinberger,47 the Court used equal protection language
from Weber to strike down a provision of the Social Security Act which com-
pletely barred a nonlegitimated afterbom4 8 illegitimate child from recovering
disability insurance benefits.49 The statute stated further that if the illegitimacy
43 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
44 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
45 409 U.S. at 538.
46 Id.; 411 U.S. at 620-21; Illegitimacy, supra note 33, at 494-96.
47 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
48 Afterborn means the child was born after the onset of the parent's disability.
49 42 U.S.C. § 416 (h) (3) 1970. Under the Social Security Act, an illegitimate child
was deemed entitled to disability insurance benefits without any showing that he was in fact
dependent upon his disabled parent if state law permitted the child to inherit from the wage-
earner parent; if his illegitimacy resulted solely from formal, nonobvious defects in his
parents' ceremonial marriage; or if he was legitimated in accordance with state law. An
illegitimate child unable to meet any of the foregoing conditions could qualify only if the dis-




was due to a formal, nonobvious defect in the parent's ceremonial marriage or
if the child was legitimized in accordance with state law, recovery was permitted.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, specifically refused to determine
whether illegitimacy was a suspect classification.5" He did state, however, that
the evils of the complete statutory bar to disability benefits did not reasonably
promote the valid governmental interest of preventing spurious claims."' In
addition, he found that the statute was "overinclusive" because it benefitted
certain types of children deemed legitimate who were not actually dependent.
Conversely, the Act was "underinclusive" because it excluded some illegitimates
who were, in fact, dependent upon their disabled parent.5 2 Those illegitimate
children who were denied benefits were not given an opportunity to prove their
dependence; they were irrebuttably presumed not to be dependent. The Court
concluded that "to conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively available
to the other denies the former the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
due process provision of the Fifth Amendment." 3 The rigor of inspection em-
ployed in Jimenez made the test closely resemble strict scrutiny.
In Mathews v. Lucas,4 however, the Court rejected appellant's argument
that illegitimacy was a suspect classification, stating that "discrimination between
individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not 'command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process' . . . which our most exacting
scrutiny would entail."5 The Court conceded that illegitimacy was analogous
in many respects to personal characteristics that have been held to be suspect
when used as the basis of statutory differentiation, but it nevertheless concluded
that the analogy was insufficient." The opinion stated:
[P]erhaps in part because the roots of the discrimination rest in the conduct
of the parents rather than the child, and perhaps in part because illegiti-
macy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, this discrimination
against illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the
historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes.57
The Court therefore adhered to its earlier stance of not applying strict scrutiny to
challenged legislation of this type.
Citing the Weber two-pronged inquiry,5" the Court in Mathews upheld a
Social Security plan providing benefits to a surviving child who was dependent
50 "Appellants urge that the contested Social Security provision is based upon the so-
called 'suspect classification' of illegitimacy. . . . We need not reach appellant's argument,
however .. " 417 U.S. at 631.
51 Id. at 636.
52 Id. at 637.
53 Id.
54 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
55 Id. at 506 (citations omitted).
56 The Court concluded that illegitimacy, like race or national origin, is a characteristic
determined by causes not within the control of the individual and that it bears no relation to
his ability to participate in and contribute to society. Moreover, because the law has long
placed the illegitimate child in an inferior position relative to the legitimate child, there has
been a history of vilification. Id. at 505-06.
57 Id. at 506 (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-86).
58 Id. at 504.
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on his parent at the time of the parent's death.59 The plan conditioned eligibility
of certain illegitimate children upon a showing that: (1) the decreased wage
earner was the claimant child's parent, and (2) the child resided with the wage
earner up to the time of death and received support during that period. How-
ever, only a child who was legitimate or statutorily deemed legitimate enjoyed
a presumption of dependency. The Court found the statutory classifications to
be justified as reasonable legislative judgements designed to qualify entitlement
to benefits upon a child's dependency at the time of the parent's death.60 It
brushed aside previous illegitimacy cases 1 saying that in all but one case the
legislation denied benefits solely because of the child's illegitimacy regardless of
dependency. In the sole partial exception, Weber, workmen's compensation
benefits hinged on proof not only that the child was dependent but, also, that the
dependent child was legitimate. The Court saw the Social Security plan as
aimed solely at establishing dependency.
In Trimble v. Gordon,"2 the most recent Supreme Court decision regarding
illegitimates, a divided Court invalidated § 12 of the Illinois Probate Act63
which allowed an illegitimate child to inherit though intestate succession from
his mother only, while a legitimate child could inherit from both parents. As it
had done in Lucas, the Court said that the constitutionality of the law in ques-
tion depended "upon the character of the discrimination and its relation to
legitimate legislative aims."'" In essence then, the Court employed the two-
fold inquiry enunciated in Weber. Using that yardstick, the Court determined
that § 12 could not be justified on the ground that it promoted legitimate family
relationships because it bore "only the most attenuated relationship to the asserted
goal." 5 The Court decided that the difficulties of proving paternity could not
justify total statutory disinheritance of an illegitimate child whose father died
intestate. Moreover, it concluded that both the legislature and the Supreme
59 Section 202 (d) (1) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402 (d) (1) (1970)
provides that an unmarried son or daughter of an individual, who died fully or currently
insured under the Act, may apply for and be entitled to a survivor's benefits, if the applicant
is under 18 years of age at the time of application (or is a full-time student and under 22
years of age) and was dependent, within the meaning of the statute, at the time of the parent's
death. A child is considered dependent for this purpose if the insured father was living with or
contributing to the child's support at the time of death. 'Certain children, however, are relieved
from the burden of showing dependency. These children include those who are legitimate or
who would be entitled to inherit personal property from the insured parent's estate under the
applicable state intestacy law. Moreover, unless adopted by another individual, a child is
entitled to a presumption of dependency if the decedent, before death, (a) had gone through a
marriage ceremony with the other parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them
which, but for a nonobvious legal defect, would have been valid, or (b) in writing had acknowl-
edged the child to be his, or (c) had been decreed by a court to be the child's father, or (d)
had been ordered by a court to support the child because the child was his. Id. at 497-99.
60 Id. at 510.
61 These included Gomez, Cahill, Weber, and Levy.
62 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
63 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1973) provided, in pertinent part, that "[ain illegitimate
child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor and of any person from whom his
mother might have inherited if living. . . . A child who was illegitimate whose parents inter-
marry and who is acknowledged by the father as the father's child is legitimate."
64 430 U.S. at 769 (citing Mathews v. Lucas which, in turn, had cited Weber for its
authority).
65 430 U.S. at 768.
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Court of Illinois" "failed to consider the possibility of a middle ground between
the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of pater-
nity."67 The Court felt that the inheritance rights of significant categories" of
illegitimate children could, be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly
settlements of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under
intestacy laws. Thus, since § 12 excluded those categories of children un-
necessarily, it was constitutionally flawed. 9
Four Justices dissented on the ground that Trimble was constitutionally
indistinguishable from Labine v. Vincent.7' The majority found Labine to be
inapplicable because it was "difficult to place in the pattern of this Court's
equal protection decisions, and subsequent cases [had] limited its force as a
precedent."'" The prevailing Justices, however, did affirm the view in Labine
that judicial deference is appropriate when the challenged statute involves a
state's interest in providing for the stability of land titles and the prompt and
accurate determination of property ownership. They concluded, however, that
such deference was not meant to be absolute; there was a point beyond which
this deference could not justify discrimination. 2 Noting that its analysis in
Trimble was more exacting than its inspection of the Louisiana statute in Labine,
the Court concluded that the more recent analysis would be controlling in the
future."3 The test utilized in Trimble is essentially the Weber twofold inquiry
which differs radically from the analysis employed in Labine. In Labine, the
Court was extremely deferential to the state legislature, choosing not to apply
any type of equal protection analysis. Therefore, although Labine has not been
specifically overruled, Trimble has severely eroded its precedential value.
Moreover, it is apparent that the Weber twofold inquiry continues to be the
analysis used by the Court in examining cases involving discrimination against
illegitimates. It is also the analysis that is applied to cases concerning discrimi-
nation based on sex.
B. Sex-Based Discrimination
The history of the Court's treatment of discrimination based on sex parallels
its approach to discrimination directed toward illegitimates. Until recently, sex-
based classifications were virtually immune from attack under the equal protec-
tion clause. Within the last seven years, however, successful challenges to legisla-
tion discriminating on the basis of sex have become increasingly frequent. As
66 On June 2, 1975, the Illinois Supreme Court handed down its opinion in In re Estate of
Karas, 61 Ill. 2d 40, 329 N.E. 2d 234 (1975), sustaining § 12 against all constitutional
challenges.
67 430 U.S. at 770-71.
68 For example, illegitimate children whose parents never married but whose father ac-
knowledged them, or illegitimate children who were in fact dependent on their father and
living with him at the time of his death were not given the opportunity to inherit from their
deceased father.
69 430 U.S. at 776.
70 See text accompanying notes 34 to 39 supra.
71 430 U.S. at 767 n. 12.
72 Id. Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate on the point of justification.
73 Id. at 776 n. 17.
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a result, this clause is a powerful weapon in combating publicly sanctioned sex
discrimination.
Before 1971, the Supreme Court generally upheld the constitutionality of
sex-based classifications. Applying the standard of minimal scrutiny, the Court
invariably7 4 held that the distinction under attack was reasonable in view of the
proper role of women in society 5 or the need of females for greater protection.7 6
Because the Court proceeded on the assumption that there were vast differences
between women and men, the different treatment accorded the sexes could easily
be found to have a rational connection to a legitimate public objective.
In 1971, however, the Court began to alter its approach to cases involving
sex discrimination. Reed v. Reed"7 marked the first time that the Court in-
validated a sex discrimination statute on equal protections grounds. The Court
in Reed rejected a mandatory provision of the Idaho probate code that gave
preference to men over women when persons of the same entitlement class ap-
plied for appointment as administrators of a decedent's estate. Using slightly
ambiguous rational basis rhetoric,"8 the Court provided relief for those dis-
advantaged by the sex-based classification. The Court applied a fairly rigorous
means-to-end analysis 9 and concluded that selecting applicants for letters of
administration on the basis of sex might fulfill the state objective of reducing the
work load on probate courts by eliminating one class of contests, but not in ac-
cordance with the demands of the equal protection clause."0
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson,"1 Justice Brennan, speaking for
a mere plurality of the Court, 2 went a step further and declared sex to be a
suspect classification. He struck down as violative of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment a federal statute which provided that husbands of female mem-
bers of the uniformed services were not "dependents" unless they were in fact
dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support. Such proof was not
required for spouses of male members because they were presumed to be de-
pendent on their husbands. Since sex was suspect, the Court strictly scrutinized
the statute and concluded that the government's interest in administrative con-
venience did not justify the character of the discrimination caused by the classifi-
cation. 3 Although the Court's scrutiny was more rigorous, its inquiry was
74 An exception was Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) which was later
overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See note 8 and text
accompanying notes 12 to 14 supra.
75 E.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-63 (1961).
76 E.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
77 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
78 Although the decision is replete with deferential rational basis phraseology, the Court
invalidated the statute. In describing the standards by which the Idaho provisions were to be
judged, the Court employed the following language: A classification "must be ieasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." Id. at 76 (citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). See also
Comment, 2 Fla. St. L. Rev. 166, 170 n. 25 (1974).
79 See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
80 404 U.S. at 76.
81 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
82 Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment based on Reed. Justices Powell and
Blackmun, as well as the Chief Justice, concurred in the judgment, but felt that it was un-
necessary to arrive at such a far-reaching holding, especially considering that the controversy
surrounding the Equal Rights Amendment remained unresolved.
83 411 U.S. at 690-91.
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identical in substance to that used in Weber, which had been decided a year
earlier. Citing Reed, the Court concluded that "any statutory scheme which
draws lines between sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative con-
venience, necessarily commands 'dissimilar treatment for men and women who
are ... similarly situated,' and therefore involves the 'very kind of arbitrary leg-
islative choice forbidden by the [Constitution].' ,84
The Court, however, did not retain its activist stance. In the next two sex
discrimination cases,"5 Kahn v. Shevins6 and Schlesinger v. Ballard,"7 the Court
applied a much more deferential standard to the challenged legislation. In Kahn,
which was decided one year after Frontiero, the Supreme Court upheld a Florida
statute which granted widows an annual $500 property tax exemption while
denying the exemption to widowers. The Court found that spousal loss
fell disproportionately upon the female sex and that the policy of the state was to
cushion the financial impact of that loss. The Court stated that the case at bar
was different from previous sex discrimination cases because it dealt with a
state tax law which was reasonably designed to further the state policy in-
volved." One year later, in Schlesinger v. Ballard, the Court upheld a federal
statute which granted tenure preferences to female naval officers.8 9 The majority,
relying heavily upon the fact that naval personnel practices offered women less
favorable opportunities to compile impressive service records, held that the statute
was a permissible means of providing women with an equitable program of
advancement in the Navy.
9
It is significant that in neither Kahn nor Ballard did the Court rely on the
Frontiero opinion. Rather, the Court deferred to the respective legislative judge-
ments by employing rational basis language with its familiar minimal scrutiny
requirement. The Court has thus tacitly advanced a benign classification theory
under which it permissively reviews legislative classifications that are beneficial
to women. This explanation for the Court's actions in Kahn and Ballard is sup-
ported by its handling of subsequent sex discrimination cases in which it has
84 Id. at 690 (emphasis in original).
85 Although Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), was decided in the interim
between Kahn and Ballard, it is not included in the text because the majority did not treat it
as a sex discrimination case. Instead, they treated it more as a state disability insurance case,
upholding a California disability insurance system for private employees temporarily disabled
by an injury or illness not covered by workmen's compensation even though the plan excluded
certain disabilities including some attributable to pregnancy. The prevailing Justices cited
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), saying that "the Equal Protection Clause does not
require that a state must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking
the problem at all." Id. at 486-87. The Court concluded that the state was not required to
sacrifice certain attributes of the system only to provide protection against another risk of
disability-normal pregnancy.
The Court distinguished Reed and Frontiero saying that the insurance program did not
exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender, but merely removed one physical
condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities. 417 U.S. at 496 n. 20.
86 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
87 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
88 416 U.S. at 355.
89 Under 10 U.S.C. § 6382 (1970), a male naval officer was allowed ten years of com-
missioned service to secure a promotion before being mandatorily discharged. A female officer,
under 10 U.S.C. § 6401 (1970), was given 13 years of active service before a mandatory dis-
charge for want of promotion could be ordered.
90 419 U.S. at 508.
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much more rigorously scrutinized legislation adversely affecting the interests of
women.
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,9 for example, a majority of the Court in-
validated as violative of the fifth amendment guarantee of due process certain
provisions of the Social Security Act. Under those provisions, the amount of
survivor's benefits granted to a widow and minor children was based on the
earnings of the deceased husband and father covered by the Act. In the case of
a deceased wife and mother, benefits were granted only to the minor children
and not to the widower. Although the widower/plaintiff was the one denied
benefits, the Court framed the matter as one involving discrimination against
women since women paid the same social security taxes as men but were deprived
equal protection for their surviving spouse. Using the analysis from Weber, the
majority concluded that the state's purpose in allowing widows to elect not to
work in order to devote themselves to caring for their children could not justify
the lack of protection given to their survivors.9" The Court decided that the
gender-based classification was "entirely irrational" and was indistinguishable
from the one held invalid in Frontiero3
In the same year in the case of Stanton v. Stanton, 4 the Court confronted a
Utah statute establishing the age of majority at twenty-one years for males and
at eighteen years for females. Appellant challenged the statute on equal protec-
tion grounds after her support payments from appellee, her father, were ter-
minated when she attained majority. The Court upheld her challenge, finding
Reed to be controlling. The majority considered the Utah Supreme Court's
"old notions" about women tending to mature earlier and marry sooner than
men to be inapplicable to their decision. The real inquiry, according to Justice
Blackmun, was "whether the difference in sex between children warrants the
distinction in the appellee's obligation to support that is drawn from the Utah
statute."9 " The Court concluded that it did not.
By the time the Stanton decision was rendered, it had become increasingly
unlikely that sex would be declared by a majority of the Court to be a suspect
classification. In fact, the Justices in Stanton greatly limited the precedential
value of the plurality opinion in Frontiero when they said, "We find it unneces-
sary in this case to decide whether a classification based on sex is inherently
suspect. '""a The Court then proceeded to use an inquiry less demanding than
strict scrutiny, but one sufficiently strong to indicate that distinctions based on
sex would not be tolerated unless very good reasons could be given to justify
them. The opinion left lower courts uncertain as to the proper level of scrutiny
91 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
92 420 U.S. at 648. The Advisory Council on Social Security, which developed the 1939
Amendments to the Act, said explicitly that the payments to the widow were intended as
supplements to the orphan's benefits with the purpose of enabling the widow to remain at
home and care for the children. Id. at 649. It was not felt that such payments were necessary
to a widower since "a man generally continues to work to support himself and his children
after the death or disability of his wife." Id. at 652-53 n. 20.
93 Id. at 651.
94 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
95 Id. at 14.
96 Id. at 13.
97 As in Reed, the Court cited Royster Guano Co., 253 U.S. at 415 to support its
decision. See note 78 supra.
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to be applied to sex discrimination cases. The Court attempted to clarify its
position in Craig v. Boren.
98
In Craig, the Court was requested to invalidate an Oklahoma statute that
prohibited the sale of "non-intoxicating" beer containing a 3.2% alcohol content
to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The state con-
tended that the purpose of the challenged legislation was the enhancement of
traffic safety. It introduced evidence showing, among other things, that both the
number of arrests for drunkenness and the number of traffic accidents were
greater for males than for females. The Court was not persuaded by these facts
and said, "[S]tatistical evidence. . . offers only a weak answer to the equal pro-
tection question presented here."9 9 It did not feel that the state's interest justi-
fied a "classification based on a three-year age differential between the sexes, and
especially one that is so easily circumvented as to be virtually meaningless."'' 0
The equal protection test enunciated by the Craig Court is a product of
sex discrimination case precedent and is coincident with the Weber two-fold
inquiry. The Court said that "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge... classifi-
cations by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."'' Inherent in this
analysis is a balancing process by which the Court weighs the state interest against
the character of the discrimination caused by the statutory classification. If the
Court concludes that the governmental interest is insufficient or is not sub-
stantially served by the classification, the statute is struck down.
The standard specified in Craig was not embraced by all of the Justices.
Four wrote concurring opinions °2 while two" 3 dissented. This lack of agreement
is indicative of the difficulty that the various members of the Supreme Court
have had in agreeing upon a standard of equal protection that can be applied
to a wide variety of legislative classifications.' This divergence of opinion is not
due solely to the varying backgrounds and beliefs of the individual Justices;
rather, it is due in substantial part to the ambiguous nature of the fourteenth
amendment itself.
IV. "Fluid" Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment has become the most litigated and controversial
of the Civil War Amendments because the search for the historical meaning of
the amendment has proven frustrating and inconclusive. The late Chief Justice
Earl Warren summarized the problem in Brown v. Board of Education:
The most avid proponents of the post-War amendments undoubtedly in-
tended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all persons born or
98 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
99 Id. at 201.
100 429 U.S. at 211 (Powell, J., concurring). The law forbade the sale of 3.2% beer to
18- to 20-year-old men without forbidding possession or preventing them from obtaining it from
other sources, such as friends who were either older or female.
101 Id. at 197.
102 Justices Powell, Blackmun, Stevens, and Stewart.
103 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist authored dissenting opinions.
104 429 U.S. at 210 n. 1 (Powell, J., concurring.)
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naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were
antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendment, and wished
them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the
state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of
certainty.105
Since the amendment's passage in 1868, the Supreme Court has occupied
the unenviable position of attempting to interpret the enigmatic words "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."' 0 The two-tier standard emerged as a judicially created tool to
aid the Court in interpreting the amendment. As the above-cited cases pointedly
illustrate, however, the Burger Court considers the traditional model to be too
rigid. Therefore, the Court has subsequently devised what has been referred to
as a "middle-tier" of equal protection analysis.' The Court has been hesitant
to acknowledge openly its new standard, but a careful reading of the equal
protection cases negates any other conclusion.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren, exemplified the
Court's reticence when he wrote:
[O]ur decision today will be viewed by some as a "niddle-tier" approach.
While I would not endorse that characterization and would not welcome a
further subdividing of equal protection analysis, candor compels the recogni-
tion that the relatively deferential "rational basis" standard of review
normally applied takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-based
classification. 08
Justice Rehnquist, in his spirited dissent in Trimble v. Gordon, recognized
this middle ground in the Court's opinions. He wrote:
[I]n several opinions of the Court, statements are found which suggest that
although illegitimates are not members of a "suspect class," laws which
treat them differently than those born in wedlock will receive a more far-
reaching scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause than will other laws
regulating economic and social conditions. 0 9
When the Justices speak of a "middle-tier" or a three-tiered analysis of equal
protection, they are actually speaking of a single mode of inquiry: that is, a
"fluid" equal protection analysis. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in
Craig v. Boren, articulated this point most succinctly when he wrote:
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered
analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to
explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably con-
sistent fashion." 0
105 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
106 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107 429 U.S. at 210 n. 1. (Powell, J., concurring).
108 Id.
109 430 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110 429 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The single standard alluded to by Justice Stevens comprises the Weber
twofold inquiry: (1) what legitimate state interest does the classification
promote? and (2) what fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger? This inquiry is applied to three categories of cases: (1) those con-
cerning economic or social legislation, (2) those involving fundamental rights
or suspect classifications, and (3) those falling in between, such as sex dis-
crimination or discrimination against illegitimate children cases.
Although the Court always examines the discriminatory nature of the statute
and the state interest offered as its justification, the rigor of the analysis employed
by the Court varies with each category. If the Court is confronted with a chal-
lenge to an economic statute, for example, it inevitably finds that the statute
bears some rational relationship to the legitimate state interest and therefore
validates the legislation. Conversely, when the Court is faced with a statute that
either impinges upon a fundamental right or discriminates on the basis of a
suspect classification, the Court requires that the state have a compelling reason
for its actions. If, as is almost always the case, the state's reason is not compelling,
the Court strikes down the statute. Finally, the Court's treatment of those laws
that involve neither economic classifications nor suspect distinctions depends on
the statute's position on a spectrum which has rational basis and strict scrutiny
at its poles. That is, the more the statutory classification approaches fundamental
rights or makes suspect distinctions, the more rigorous the scrutiny employed and
the stronger the state justification necessary. If the Court determines that the
state interest served by the legislative classification does not justify the legislation's
discriminatory character or that the discriminatory statute is only tenuously re-
lated to that objective, then the statute is invalidated. This analytical spectrum
is what is meant by "fluid" equal protection. The test enunciated in Craig v.
Boren is a point on this spectrum and serves to inform legislators of the level of
scrutiny the Court will invoke in evaluating sex-based distinctions.
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
recognized the Court's "fluid" approach when he wrote:
The model's two fixed modes of analysis, strict scrutiny and mere rationality,
simply do not describe the inquiry the Court has undertaken . . . in equal
protection cases. Rather, the inquiry has ... focused upon the character of
the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the
class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not
receive, and the state interest asserted in support of the classification."'
Thus, a close reading of the above-cited cases reveals that the Supreme Court
has employed a single analytical device, the Weber twofold inquiry, when ex-
amining legislation challenged on equal protection grounds. The Court's analysis
is best conceptualized as a spectrum that has rational basis and strict scrutiny at
its poles. The level of the Court's scrutiny varies as a function of the challenged
statute's position on the spectrum. The Court's approach is sufficiently malleable
to apply to all equal protection cases. This characteristic is perhaps a reaction
111 427 U.S. 307, 318 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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by the Court to the perceived rigidity of the basic two-tier model. In any event,
the most prominent feature of the "fluid" analysis is its flexibility. This same
flexibility, however, is also the greatest weakness of the "fluid" approach because
it enables the Court to have virtually unfettered discretion in regard to cases
falling in between the extremes of the spectrum to determine the legitimacy of the
state interest and the adequacy with which the statute serves that interest.
The problems are readily apparent. The Court, by placing itself in a legisla-
tive position, can second-guess federal and state legislative judgments in areas
where it has little or no expertise. This is troublesome because, as Justice
Rehnquist said in Trimble, "there is absolutely nothing to be implied from the
fact that [the Justices] hold judicial commissions that would enable [them] to
answer any one of these questions better than the legislators to whose initial
decision they were committed." 1 2
Cases such as Glona, Weber, Trimble, and Craig indicate that the Court has
not refrained from exercising its power of review. It has not hesitated to in-
validate statutes when it felt that the legislation did not promote the state interest
specified or was "so easily circumvented as to be virtually meaningless.""' 3 As
a result, legislators have faced a dilemma when enacting legislation that affected
classifications in the middle of the spectrum, such as sex and illegitimacy, because
they could not be certain how the Court would react. A classic example is
Trimble. The law invalidated in that case was very similar to the one upheld in
Labine; in fact, four Supreme Court Justices and the highest state court of
Illinois found the cases to be indistinguishable. Legislators, when drafting
legislation concerning these areas, could justifiably wonder what they had to do
to be within constitutional limits.
This problem of uncertainty is not nearly as severe with cases falling into
either one of the two established tiers. Legislators know that when they devise
laws regulating economic or social conditions the law must merely have a rea-
sonable relationship to a legitimate state interest. Conversely, when legislators
pass laws impinging on fundamental rights or making suspect classifications, they
know that the statutes will be invalidated unless a compelling reason is shown." 4
Thus, the Court's predictable responses alleviate confusion and provide for uni-
formity.
The plight of legislators in enacting statutes that fall between these extremes
may have been eased somewhat by the Court's enunciation of the Craig standard
which states that classifications by gender must serve "important governmental
objectives" and must be "substantially related" to the achievement of those ob-
jectives. They were thus given an indication of where on the spectrum the
statutes would fall and of the consequent level of scrutiny the Court would employ
when it examined legislation challenged as sexually discriminatory."' Still,
questions remain. Who is to decide what is an "important governmental ob-
jective"? What does "substantially related" mean? "Both of the phrases used
112 430 U.S. at 784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113 429 U.S. at 211 (Powell, J., concurring).
114 See note 21 supra.
115 It is conceivable that the Craig standard will be applied to illegitimate children cases.
This seems likely considering the parallel treatment the two areas have received over the years.
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are so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or
prejudices relating to particular types of legislation, masquerading as judgments
whether such legislation is directed at 'important' objectives, or whether the re-
lationship to these objectives is 'substantial' enough.""'
The subjective approach taken by the Supreme Court in cases falling be-
tween the two tiers is similar to its substantive due process approach" 7 of the
early 1900's. As before, the Court has been unable to devise a general equal
protection standard for evaluating such legislation that adequately covers the
wide variety of statutory classifications with which the Court must contend. The
inquiries used in Weber and Craig lack specificity and are insufficiently objective
to be applied as general standards. In addition, after examining Kahn and
Ballard, it cannot be maintained that the Court has applied its reasoning con-
sistently. Finally, the Court's expansive view of equally protected rights has
caused it to deliberate over such unimportant matters as whether or not an
18-year-old male can buy beer. These similarities are both disturbing and un-
fortunate since the Court's previous treatment of cases under substantive due
process has been disavowed by the Court itself." 8
What is perhaps most ironic is that this is the same Court that was reluctant
to add to the list of fundamental interests and suspect classifications specified by
its predecessors. By using its subjective form of analysis, however, the Court has
invalidated statutes that it would have sustained using a rational basis approach.
Thus, the result has been practically the same as if they had labelled sex and
illegitimacy to be suspect classifications and thereby examined legislation affect-
ing these areas with strict scrutiny.
V. Conclusion
There are two reasons why it is difficult to criticize the Court's handling,
under the banner of equal protection, of cases involving sex-based discrimination
and discrimination against illegitimate children. First, as noted earlier, the Court
has been put in the unenviable position of trying to interpret those pregnant words
of the fourteenth amendment with little or no legislative guidance. Second, there
seems to be no real reason to discriminate against people because of characteristics
with which they were born. As the Court cogently pointed out in Weber:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bands of marriage. But
visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is both illogical and
unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is con-
trary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an
116 429 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117 See text accompanying notes 5 to 14 supra.
118 See text accompanying notes 10 to 14 supra. Indeed, by comparing these character-
istics with those of "fluid" equal protection, a marked resemblance in the two approaches can
be seen. In the substantive due process era, the Court extended the meaning of "liberty" and
"property." The present Court's expansive attitude toward equally protected rights parallels
that earlier approach. Arguably, this is substantive due process under another heading.
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ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent.119
It is equally illogical and unjust to discriminate against a woman because of her
sex.
What is disturbing, however, is not the Court's specific holdings, but rather,
it is the confusion and inconsistency generated by the subjective judicial activism
that characterizes the Court's approach to cases in the "middle-tier' between
rational basis and strict scrutiny. Moreover, the Court's case-by-case approach to
these cases has provided only a fragile solution to the difficulties confronting
women and illegitimate children because of discrimination. A case in point is
Trimble. Although the Court would not so acknowledge, it in essence overruled,
by a five to four vote, the holding in Labine. The closeness of the decision
strikingly illustrates the instability of the Court's resolution of these matters and
demonstrates how the opinion of a single Justice about the validity of a statutory
classification may be sufficient to overturn the judgment of an entire state legis-
lature elected by the populace.
In order to correct these existing deficiencies, the present Court should ad-
here to the two-tier formula of its predecessors. It must, in short, decide whether
it will treat cases involving sex-based discrimination and discrimination against
illegitimate children with minimal or strict scrutiny. Both categories of in-
dividuals have been historically vilified. Moreover, both traditionally have
lacked political power. Most importantly, however, both categories include
people with characteristics that are immutable (and in the case of women, highly
visible) which are determined solely by birth and which bear no relation to an
ability to perform in or contribute to society.
Considering the similarities that the two categories bear to characteristics
that the Court has declared to be associated with a suspect class,"' the Court
should alter its "middle-tier" approach and treat these areas with the most
searching analysis of strict scrutiny. 2 ' Such a bold step may be criticized as an
unwarranted display of judicial activism. Here, however, activism is necessary
in view of the long history of discrimination against women and illegitimate
children and the demonstrated unwillingness of state legislators to respect equally
their natural rights.
By declaring these categories to be suspect, the Court will put both state
and federal legislators on notice that distinctions made on the basis of either char-
acteristic must be grounded on a compelling governmental interest. Because
statutes rarely, if ever, pass strict scrutiny muster, legislators will be deterred
119 406 U.S. at 175.
120 See note 20 supra.
121 If, on the other hand, the Court determines that rational basis is the appropriate level
of analysis, then it appears that a constitutional amendment will be necessary to protect the
rights of people falling into these discriminated categories. An amendment similar to the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) with a provision to cover discrimination on the basis of
illegitimacy would be appropriate.
The Court may understandably wish to wait until the controversy surrounding the
proposed ERA is resolved before it declares sex to be a suspect classification. But the chances
that illegitimates will be able to rally enough political support to push through an amendment
protecting them are indeed slender. Consequently, it is urged that the Court declare illegitimacy
to be suspect at its first opportunity.
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from making 'those distinctions. 2 As a result, the Justices will no longer have
to undergo the self-imposed burden of defining terms like "important govern-
mental objectives" and "substantially related." Their decisions will thus be more
definitive, less confusing, and above all, more equitable. Consequently, women
and illegitimates will finally be given what has been rightfully theirs all the time-
full equal protection under the law.
John K. Vincent
122 See note 21 supra.
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